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Introduction
The responsiveness of parties to public opinion is generally 
seen as a prerequisite for the functioning of modern liberal 
democracies. There are two ways that responsiveness can 
occur: indirectly, through electoral turnover, or directly, by 
parties adjusting their policies in line with changes in pub-
lic opinion (Stimson et al., 1995). A growing literature on 
the strategic behaviour of political parties argues that par-
ties do indeed follow this direct mechanism (Adams, 2012). 
Many studies have demonstrated that political parties react 
to shifts in public opinion (Adams et al., 2004), that they 
respond differently to different segments of the electorate 
(Adams and Ezrow, 2009; Homola, 2019), and that main-
stream parties’ responses differ from those of niche parties 
(Adams et al., 2006; Bischof and Wagner, 2017). This lit-
erature on the dynamic adjustment of political parties has 
made an important contribution in linking formal spatial 
models to empirical evidence on the behaviour of real-
world political parties.
In this article, we re-evaluate parties’ policy responsive-
ness, applying a novel measure of public opinion. Empirical 
analyses of this question so far have largely relied on 
measuring public opinion using left–right self-placement 
extracted from surveys to derive a cross-national measure 
of public opinion. However, as noted in this literature itself, 
this approach comes with a number of problems.
The first is a lack of data, because self-placement is 
measured from the Eurobarometer survey. Figure 1 in the 
Online Appendix shows how mean left–right placement 
has evolved in 25 European countries that have appeared in 
this paper since 1980. As non-EU countries are not covered 
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by the Eurobarometer, many countries have data for less 
than half of the period, and two countries that feature in this 
paper – Norway and Switzerland – do not feature at all in 
the Eurobarometer data. This lack of coverage is one of the 
reasons why classic papers on policy responsiveness in 
Europe such as Adams et al. (2004, 2006) in fact cover only 
8 of these 27 countries.
Second, it is uni-dimensional. Political conflict in 
Europe no longer occurs along one left–right dimension. In 
addition to traditional conflict over state involvement in the 
economy, there are now one or possibly two more dimen-
sions that include questions of the basic organising princi-
ples of society such as gender equality or immigration 
(Caughey et al., 2019; Inglehart, 1990; Kriesi et al., 2006). 
In this sense, left–right self-identification can at best cap-
ture one dimension of dynamic representation. Since many 
people are ‘cross-pressured’ – economically conservative 
but socially liberal – and then often label themselves as 
centrist, despite holding very non-centrist opinions (Treier 
and Hillygus, 2009), left–right self-placement may fail to 
capture any dimension accurately.
Third, many respondents do not know what policies are 
associated with ‘left’ and ‘right’, meaning that the meas-
ure is strongly influenced by partisanship and identifica-
tion with partisan groups (Klingemann, 1979; Knutsen, 
1997; Medina, 2013).1 Self-described centrists also often 
choose centrist responses because they simply do not 
understand what the survey question is asking them 
(Knutsen, 1998; Rodon, 2015). Because of this and the 
issue of ‘cross-pressure’, over-time variation in mean 
left–right self-placements is implausibly low (see Figure 
1 in the Online Appendix). Many countries’ ideologies, on 
this measure, have remained virtually unchanged since 
the 1980s, despite widespread liberalisation of opinions 
on social issues such as gender equality and LGBT (les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights.
Fourth, it is susceptible to differential item functioning. 
Across countries, citizens interpret the question as being 
about different issues (Thorisdottir et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 
2017). Over time, the increasing multi-dimensionality of 
politics means that people interpret ‘left’ and ‘right’ differ-
ently now than they did in the past (De Vries et al., 2013; 
Knutsen, 1995). This makes over-time or cross-country 
comparisons difficult.
Despite these problems, scholars have understandably 
relied on left–right self-placement as the only available 
measure of citizens’ ideologies across time and space 
derived from surveys. Adams et al. (2019) note that with 
the exception of European integration, it has to date been 
impossible to test responsiveness across multiple dimen-
sions. Happily, that is no longer the case. Instead of left–
right self-placement, we use Caughey et al.’s (2019) 
measures of ideology. Based on a Bayesian dynamic group-
level item response theory model including more than 2.7 
million survey responses, they measured ideological posi-
tions for four policy dimensions (‘absolute’ economic 
ideology, ‘relative’ economic ideology – the desire for 
more or less government spending – social issues, and 
immigration issues) for 27 European countries from 1981–
2016. The issue questions that make up the scales are easier 
to understand than left–right self-placement, and differen-
tial item functioning is less of an issue because the ques-
tions have a more universal meaning across time and 
countries. Their paper contains extensive validations of the 
measures, including formal tests of construct- and conver-
gent validity, as well as demonstrating face validity.2
We adopted a definition of responsiveness that is in line 
with classic empirical studies: that responsiveness can be 
said to have occurred when parties shift their positions in the 
same direction as voters’ ideological shifts.3 We measured 
parties’ dimension-specific policy positions with data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP/Manifesto 
Research on Political Representation project) (Volkens 
et al., 2018). Using these outcome measures together with 
the new scales for public opinion, we re-examined whether 
parties generally move their positions in line with public 
opinion, whether they respond more strongly to harmful 
opinion shifts (Adams et al., 2004) and whether mainstream 
parties are more responsive to shifts in public opinion than 
niche parties (Adams et al., 2006; Bischof and Wagner, 
2017). In a series of analyses with varying specifications, 
we did not find any consistent evidence that parties respond 
to short-term shifts in public opinion, measured using mani-
festos. This included subsets for different regions (Western 
vs. Eastern Europe), different time periods and different par-
ties as well as different outcome scales. These findings have 
important implications for the literature on party competi-
tion as they challenge what has become one of its crucial 
assumptions: that parties are responsive to public opinion.
Data and methodology
Our analysis includes all countries that have both ideologi-
cal data and data on party positions from CMP: 26 in all, 
nearly trebling the number of countries compared with past 
studies.4 We were also able to considerably expand the 
period covered, up to 2017. Most previous studies (with the 
exception of Bischof and Wagner, 2017) stop in the late 
1990s or early 2000s. The contents of the four ideological 
scales that we used are shown in the third column of Table 
1. As we demonstrate in the Online Appendix, our findings 
are robust to several other specifications of these scales. We 
measured parties’ ideological positions from the CMP sepa-
rately for each dimension, using the logit scaling method of 
Lowe et al. (2011). We created scales that matched the issue 
content of the ideological scales as closely as possible. The 
coding categories used from the CMP are shown in the 
fourth and fifth columns of Table 1. We included all parties 
that received 1% or more of the vote on average for the 
elections that they contested in our dataset. We also fol-
lowed previous studies in excluding parties that represent 
only a specific region (e.g. those from Catalunya), agrarian 
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parties, and parties that campaign only on single issues, all 
of whom should not be expected to respond to overall 
national public opinion.
As is standard with CMP data, each of our four scales 
measured parties’ positions using the balance of right-wing 
and left-wing ‘quasi-sentences’ in a manifesto. The more 
positive the score, the more right-wing expressions there 
are relative to left-wing. The scores ranged from roughly 
−5 to 5, with standard deviations (SDs) between 1.63 and 
2.04 and means close to or slightly below zero, except 
for relative economic issues where most parties express 
more pro-spending than anti-spending views. In the Online 
Appendix, we show that these scales produce sensible dis-
tributions by party type. To measure responsiveness, we 
followed the approach of two previous classic studies – 
Adams et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2006) – examining 
how party positions respond to changes in citizens’ ideo-
logical positions, but did so separately for each of the four 
ideological dimensions. The period covered by each ideo-
logical scale is shown in the second column of Table 1; they 
are available biannually. We matched each party’s domain-
specific ideological position from the CMP with the nearest 
complete observation of its citizens’ ideologies. Thus for an 
election held in either 2016 or 2017, each party was matched 
with the ideological score of its country’s citizens for 
2015–2016.5 Each ideological scale had a mean of close to 
zero and SDs that ranged from 0.77 to 0.91.
In line with past studies, we used OLS regressions where 
the unit of analysis is each party at each election, clustering 
standard errors by election. For each of the four issue areas 
that we considered, the dependent variable was the change 
in dimension-specific left–right party position (e.g. social 
issues) since the previous election. The main independent 
variable of interest was the change in the dimension-spe-
cific left–right ideological position of the country’s citizens 
since the previous election. We also followed Adams et al. 
(2004, 2006) in including country fixed effects with no 
overall intercept, as well as controlling for a lag of the 
dependent variable, a lag of the change in the party’s vote 
share (i.e. between the previous two elections), and an 
interaction between the lagged dependent variable and the 
lagged change in vote share.
We carried out three different tests for responsiveness. 
The first simply asked whether parties respond to public 
opinion shifts in general. The second repeated the main test 
from Adams et al. (2004), asking whether responsiveness is 
conditioned by the type of public opinion shift: benign or 
harmful. Testing this involved respecifying public opinion 
shifts as ‘harmful’ when opinion moved in a direction that 
should make it harder for that party to be elected, assuming 
spatial voting (e.g. a left-wing party facing a rightward shift 
in public opinion), and ‘benign’ in the opposite situation 
(e.g. a right-wing party facing a rightward shift in opinion). 
The third repeated the main test from Adams et al. (2006), 
Table 1. Ideological scales from Caughey et al. (2019) and corresponding party position measures used from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP).
Ideological scale Period covered Issues covered Corresponding CMP Corresponding CMP
 Right-wing categories Left-wing categories
Absolute 
economic
1981–2016 Economic ideology 
(e.g. desirability of 
redistribution in principle)
401 (free market economy) 403 (market regulation)
402 (incentives) 404 (economic planning)
414 (economic orthodoxy) 412 (controlled economy)
702 (labour groups: negative) 413 (nationalisation)
 415 (Marxist analysis: positive)
 503 (equality: positive)
 701 (labour groups: positive)
Relative 
economic
1985–2016 Desire for more or less 
government spending and 
taxation relative to status 
quo (akin to ‘mood’)
505 (welfare state limitation) 504 (welfare state expansion)
507 (education limitation) 506 (education expansion)
Social/
postmaterial 
issues
1981–2016 Gender equality, LGBT 
rights, abortion, divorce, 
right to protest, marijuana 
legalisation, environmental 
issues, etc.
203 (constitutionalism: 
positive)
204 (constitutionalism: negative)
603 (traditional morality: 
positive)
501 (environmental protection: 
positive)
605 (law and order: positive) 604 (traditional morality: negative)
 705 (underprivileged minority 
groups)
Immigration and 
nationalism
1989–2016 Immigration, national 
identity
601 (national way of life: 
positive)
602 (national way of life: negative)
608 (multiculturalism: 
negative)
607 (multiculturalism: positive)
Note: LGBT = lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.
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asking whether responsiveness is conditioned by party 
type: niche or mainstream. Testing this involved adding a 
dummy variable for niche parties and an interaction 
between this dummy and shifts in citizens’ ideologies. All 
of these additional variables were coded identically to the 
original papers. For instance, niche parties are parties from 
the green, communist/socialist and nationalist families.
Results
The results of our three tests are shown in tables 2, 3 and 4. 
We used the original variable names from Adams et al. 
(2004, 2006) for ease of comparison. The main variable of 
interest in Table 2 is public opinion shift: the change in each 
country’s domain-specific ideological position since the 
last election. Table 3 distinguishes between harmful and 
benign shifts in citizens’ ideology. There, harmful public 
opinion shift equals the change in citizens’ ideology when 
the change is harmful (as defined above) and zero other-
wise, and benign public opinion shift equals the change in 
citizens’ ideology when the change is benign and zero oth-
erwise. Table 4 distinguishes between niche and main-
stream parties: niche equals 1 for niche parties and zero 
otherwise. In all three tables, previous policy shift refers to 
the lagged change in party position, and previous change in 
vote share measures the lagged change in the party’s vote 
share. Higher values for the dependent variable always 
indicate the party adopting a more right-wing stance in the 
given domain and higher values for public opinion shift 
indicate greater conservatism amongst citizens for the 
given domain. Positive coefficients for the public opinion 
shift variables would therefore imply responsiveness.
We found virtually no evidence that parties respond to 
opinion shifts in any of the issue domains, regardless of the 
Table 2. Tests of general domain-specific responsiveness.
Absolute 
economic
Relative 
economic
Social/
postmaterial
Immigration/
nationalism
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public opinion shift† 0.03
(0.09)
0.11
(0.17)
−0.23
(0.23)
0.22
(0.29)
Previous policy shift −0.35**
(0.04)
−0.37**
(0.05)
−0.38**
(0.05)
−0.46**
(0.03)
Previous change in vote share 0.007
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.007)
0.01
(0.01)
Previous policy shift × previous change in vote share 0.0007
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.007)
0.02
(0.007)
0.003
(0.004)
Observations 826 745 826 646
Note: †= absolute economic scale (1); relative economic scale (2); social issues scale (3); immigration scale (4). Standard errors clustered by election. 
All models include country fixed effects.
**p < 0.05.
Table 3. Tests of domain-specific responsiveness for harmful and benign opinion shifts.
Absolute 
economic
Relative 
economic
Social/
postmaterial
Immigration/
nationalism
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Harmful public opinion shift† 0.12
(0.12)
0.16
(0.21)
−0.23
(0.32)
0.14
(0.39)
Benign public opinion shift† −0.04
(0.12)
0.08
(0.20)
−0.23
(0.24)
0.28
(0.30)
Previous policy shift −0.35**
(0.04)
−0.37**
(0.05)
−0.38**
(0.05)
−0.46**
(0.03)
Previous change in vote share 0.007
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.07)
0.01
(0.01)
Previous policy shift × previous change in vote share 0.0008
(0.004)
− 0.004
(0.007)
0.02
(0.007)
0.003
(0.004)
Observations 826 745 826 646
Note: †= absolute economic scale (1); relative economic scale (2); social issues scale (3); immigration scale (4). Standard errors clustered by election. 
All models include country fixed effects.
**p < 0.05.
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type of party or the type of opinion shift. For all four issue 
areas, there was no evidence of statistically significant 
responses to ideological change (Table 2, first row), and no 
evidence of responsiveness to either harmful or benign ideo-
logical changes (Table 3, first two rows). The issue was not 
simply a lack of power to detect an effect. Instead, the esti-
mated coefficients were substantially small and close to zero. 
Take as an example the largest coefficient on public opinion 
in Table 2, for immigration/nationalism. The SD of the party 
position variable for immigration is 2.04 and that of the immi-
gration ideology scale is 0.88. Thus a 1-SD shift of the public 
to the right on immigration is estimated to be associated with 
only a 0.1-SD increase in parties’ immigration conservatism.
There was also very little evidence that responsiveness 
is moderated by type of party (Table 4, first three rows), 
except that niche parties were estimated to respond virtu-
ally one-to-one to changes in voters’ immigration ideolo-
gies. This finding is consistent with, for example, far-right 
parties becoming more opposed to immigration when their 
citizens become more opposed, and vice-versa for niche 
parties of the left. Even here however, with so many 
hypotheses being tested at once without adjustments for 
multiple testing, one should expect to see an occasional 
false positive result even in a world where all all effects are 
truly zero (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). Overall, our 
findings suggest that policy responsiveness to public opin-
ion shifts is at best confined only to a small subset of par-
ties on the single issue of immigration.
The Online Appendix extensively explores the robust-
ness of these results. Our first robustness checks involved 
changing the sample used. Our results were unchanged 
both when we restricted attention only to Western European 
countries6 and when we used only elections from before 
1999, the same period covered by Adams et al. (2004, 
2006). Our second set of robustness checks explored sev-
eral different codings of the dependent variables, full details 
of which are in the Online Appendix. First, it might be con-
sidered questionable whether environmental issues belong 
in the social/postmaterial category. Lowe et al. (2011), for 
example, argue that environmental issues are more about 
economics and should be considered separately. We there-
fore recoded the party positions on social issues without the 
inclusion of environmental issues. Second, we explored 
recoding (a) absolute economic issues using the ‘free mar-
ket economy’ scale proposed by Lowe et al. (2011); (b) 
relative economic issues using the ‘state involvement in the 
economy’ scale proposed by Benoit and Laver (2007); (c) 
social/postmaterial issues using the ‘social liberal–conserv-
ative’ scale proposed by Benoit and Laver (2007); and (d) 
using the ‘liberal–authoritarian’ scale proposed by Wagner 
and Meyer (2017). The results were again unchanged in 
all cases.
Finally, we explored changing the matching between 
citizens’ ideological positions and party positions. Instead 
of only using citizens’ ideological positions determined 
wholly before an election year, we considered ideological 
positions determined during and potentially after an election 
year. This means that, for instance, a party whose election 
occurred in 2015 is matched with the citizens’ ideological 
position from 2015–2016 instead of 2013–2014. Again, 
this had no impact on the results.
Discussion
Across many different model specifications, variable cod-
ings and samples we found robust evidence that European 
parties do not respond to shifts in their citizens’ ideological 
positions – at least as responsiveness has been defined by 
Table 4. Tests of responsiveness for niche and mainstream parties.
Absolute 
economic
Relative 
economic
Social/
postmaterial
Immigration/
nationalism
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public opinion shift† 0.12
(0.09)
0.07
(0.22)
−0.22
(0.26)
−0.04
(0.30)
Niche party 0.06
(0.09)
−0.24*
(0.13)
0.02
(0.12)
0.01
(0.15)
Public opinion shift × niche party −0.30**
(0.15)
0.10
(0.29)
−0.05
(0.39)
0.96**
(0.45)
Previous policy shift −0.35**
(0.04)
−0.37**
(0.05)
−0.38**
(0.05)
−0.46**
(0.04)
Previous change in vote share 0.007
(0.005)
−0.007
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.007)
0.01
(0.01)
Previous policy shift × previous change in vote share 0.0007
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.007)
0.02
(0.007)
0.002
(0.004)
Observations 826 745 826 646
Note: †= absolute economic scale (1); relative economic scale (2); social issues scale (3); immigration scale (4). Standard errors clustered by election. 
All models include country fixed effects.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05.
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classic studies, using manifesto data as the outcome meas-
ure.7 The new ideological scales provided by Caughey et al. 
(2019) enabled us to surmount many of the problems that 
exist with left–right self-placement data, allowing us to 
estimate responsiveness across a much wider set of coun-
tries and years as well as across multiple issue dimensions, 
respecting the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary 
European politics.
Our results suggest that prominent theories of repre-
sentation in Europe may need to be reconsidered. From a 
normative perspective this may be worrying. The respon-
siveness of parties to voters is generally considered to be 
a cornerstone of democracy. It begs the question of what 
can explain the lack of responsiveness. We can suggest 
several possibilities to guide future research. The first is 
that the theory is correct, but we were unable to confirm it 
with the available data on party positions. Criticisms of 
the CMP abound in the literature (e.g. Mikhaylov et al., 
2012), and changes in party positions measured by the 
CMP correlate poorly with other alternative measures 
purporting to capture the same concept (Adams et al., 
2019). As Adams et al. (2019) argue, political scientists 
may need to rethink their reliance on the CMP and instead 
explore other measures of parties’ policy commitments. 
Alternatives include party press releases (Sagarzazu and 
Klüver, 2017), leaders’ speeches (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 
2008) or voting advice applications (Gemenis, 2013).
Another possibility is that responsiveness does occur, 
but differently than via the framework used in this paper 
and in classic past studies. Responsiveness may occur more 
in response to changes in voters’ issue priorities than to 
their issue opinions (Klüver and Spoon, 2016). Or perhaps 
parties respond not to the electorate in general, but to sub-
constituencies such as citizens who are more engaged with 
politics (see Adams and Ezrow, 2009), swing voters, groups 
with higher turnout, or their own party supporters. Testing 
many of these theories would require estimating multi-
dimensional ideological positions for sub-groups, which is 
feasible using the methodology of Caughey et al. (2019).
Moreover, we looked only at short-term shifts in public 
opinion and party positions. Normatively, Mair (2009) 
argued that ‘responsible’ parties need not be responsive to 
short-term shifts in opinion, making decisions in the inter-
est of the longer-term greater good. None of our results rule 
out the possibility that parties respond to broad shifts in 
opinion over longer time horizons than election-to-election. 
For example, the British Conservative Party made virtually 
no response to the large-scale liberalisation of public opin-
ion on social and postmaterial issues from the early 1980s 
until the election of David Cameron as their leader in 2005. 
He quickly changed the party’s position towards greater 
support for environmental causes and LGBT rights. This 
large and sudden change in its position produced long-term 
congruence between the party’s policy position and public 
opinion.
Finally, policy positions are far from the only way in 
which parties can respond to public opinion. Changes in 
policies themselves are arguably a much more normatively 
important form of responsiveness, and again this type of 
responsiveness is not inconsistent with our results. Indeed, 
Caughey et al. (2019) find that countries do in fact respond 
to left-wing shifts on relative economic issues by raising 
the generosity of welfare provision. To us, a greater empha-
sis on policy responsiveness would represent an important 
way forward in this literature.
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Notes
1. Although see Huber (1989) for a dissenting view.
2. For instance, they show that in the aftermath of the recent 
refugee crisis, outlying countries receiving a lot of refugees 
such as Greece, Hungary and Italy turned against immigra-
tion more than other countries, and that all countries became 
substantially more left-wing in terms of relative economic 
issues after the financial crisis.
3. It is important to note that such a specification does not pre-
clude the possibility that voters are responding to parties.
4. We included all available countries included in Figure 1 
in the Online Appendix except Luxembourg, which does 
not feature in the Caughey et al. (2019) data. We added in 
Norway and Switzerland. Germany is included from 1990 
onwards. We excluded Northern Ireland.
5. In the Online Appendix, we show that our results are robust 
to changing the way that the ideological scales and party 
positions are matched.
6. The only exception being immigration, where we found 
some evidence of general responsiveness, significant at the 
10% level. The same caveat for multiple testing applies.
7. An alternative interpretation of our results is that the direc-
tion of the relationship is the other way around. That is, that 
we found no evidence of voters responding to parties. This 
possibility has generally been assumed away in many past 
studies, although Adams et al. (2011) tested it and found 
no evidence that voters respond to party manifestos. Future 
work should pay more explicit attention to the direction of 
the relationship between elites and voters.
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